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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court of Florida was active this year, ruling on two very
important cases in the child welfare field. In the area of termination of pa-
rental rights, it held that Florida's termination statute, providing that parental
rights of a child may be terminated when the rights to a sibling have already
been terminated,' does not create a rebuttable presumption that the parent
must overcome to avoid transmission.2 In other words, the burden of proof is
not shifted to the parent. The State must prove a substantial risk of signifi-
cant harm to the current child and do so by clear and convincing evidence.3
In a second case, S.B. v. Department of Children and Families,4 the Supreme
Court of Florida ruled that where a parent's right to counsel in a dependency
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center, Fort
Lauderdale, Florida. This article covers cases through June 30, 2004, with one exception.
The author thanks Michele Forte, Jennifer Pearl, and Christopher Sprague for their assistance
in the preparation of this article.
1. FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(i) (2004).
2. Fla. Dep't of Children & Families v. F.L., 880 So. 2d 602, 609 (Fla. 2004).
3. Id. at 609-10.
4. 851 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 2003).
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proceeding arises solely from statute,5 the parent may not raise ineffective
assistance of counsel in a collateral proceeding by writ of habeas corpus.6
At the intermediate appellate court level, the courts spent a substantial
period of time dealing with a number of child welfare issues involving both
dependency and termination of parental rights. The appellate courts applied
the so-called "nexus" test, holding that in finding for termination, the trial
court must tie harmful behavior by the parent to the particular child who is
the subject of the proceeding.7 The appellate courts also dealt with cases
involving incarcerated parents 8 and the obligations of the trial court to prop-
erly handle situations where a parent fails to appear.9
Florida's intermediate appellate courts were less active in the delin-
quency area, with one major exception: Tate v. State.10 Tate is the highly
publicized ruling from the Fourth District Court of Appeal on the court's role
in determining competency of a juvenile to stand trial.11 In addition, the ap-
pellate courts ruled on several cases involving delinquency issues arising in
the school setting. 2
II. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
A. Adjudicatory Issues
Tate, the competency case which drew national attention, involved the
death of a six-year old playmate at the hands of a twelve-year old boy.13 The
case initially resulted in a conviction in adult court and a life sentence for the
5. See § 39.013(1). The court previously held that a parent has a constitutional, as op-
posed to statutory, right to counsel in a dependency proceeding only when the proceeding
could result in termination of parental rights or if a parent could potentially be charged with
child abuse. In re D.B., 385 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1980).
6. S.B., 851 So. 2d at 691.
7. J.F. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 866 So. 2d 81, 87 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004);
N.S. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 857 So. 2d 1000, 1001 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
8. In re A.D.C., 854 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003); C.B. v. Dep't of Children
& Families, 874 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
9. R.P. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 835 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003);
R.H. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 860 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2003); In re
I.A., 857 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003); In re B.B., 858 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 2003); In re C.D., 867 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003); A.M. v. Dep't of
Children & Families, 853 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
10. 864 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
11. Id. at 47.
12. State v. J.T.D., 851 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003); M.H. v. State, 851 So.
2d 233 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
13. Tate, 864 So. 2d at 47.
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defendant, Lionel Tate. 14 The appellate opinion established a procedural
approach to the evaluation of competency for the young defendant in Flor-
ida's juvenile and adult criminal justice systems. 5 The Tate case was also
the impetus for a special issue of the NOVA LAW REVIEW entitled The After-
math of the Lionel Tate Case.'6
Competence recently came up again in Department of Children and
Families v. C.R.C.,17 involving the issue of proper placement of a child who
was previously determined incompetent to stand trial due to mental illness.
Florida law provides that when a child is found incompetent based on mental
illness or retardation, the child may be committed to the Department of Chil-
dren and Families (DCF) for restoration of competency, treatment, and train-
ing.'8 If a child is adjudicated incompetent to proceed solely because of age
or immaturity, the child must not be committed to DCF. 19 In C.R.C., the trial
court received two reports from examining psychologists concluding that the
child was not competent to stand trial on the basis of the child's age and un-
derstanding. 20 Neither expert found incompetency on mental illness or retar-
dation grounds.2' However, the court made such a finding and ordered the
child placed with DCF.22 The appellate court reversed, holding quite simply
that the trial court's order departed from the requirements of Chapter 985,23
because its findings were not supported by the written reports of the examin-
ers. 
24
Delinquency charges based upon school-related activities often come
before the Florida courts. In these cases, a common issue is the legality of a
search conducted in the school. The leading case is the 1985 United States
Supreme Court opinion in New Jersey v. T.L.O.,25 in which the high Court
ruled that school officials must have reasonable grounds to suspect that the
search would produce evidence that the student violated either school rules
or the law.26 T.L.O. related cases have been the subject of analysis in this
14. Id. at 46.
15. Id. at48.
16. See generally 28 NOVA L. REv. p. 467-603 (2004).
17. 867 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
18. FLA. STAT. § 985.223(2) (2004).
19. Id.
20. C.R.C., 867 So. 2d at 593.
21. Id. at 593-94.
22. Id. at 594.
23. FLA. STAT. ch. 985 (2004).
24. Id.
25. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
26. Id. at 341.
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review in the past.27 In State v. J. T.D.,28 the Second District Court of Appeal
reversed the trial court's suppression of a child's confession in a delinquency
case arising out of a petition charging a middle schooler with lewd and las-
civious molestation of another student.29  The school investigation of the
child involved both a St. Petersburg police officer and the school's resource
officer.30 The court held that the school official was not acting as an en-
forcement agent, and therefore, the necessity for Miranda warnings did not
exist.3' The court found that the police officer was merely present during the
interview, although in and out of the room, and asked no questions. 32 The
opinion also states that the officer heard the admission, and that after the
admission, the school official turned the questioning over to the police offi-
cial.33 The officer started to read the child Miranda warnings but, because
another problem arose, he left and never completed them.34 The appellate
court held that under the facts, Miranda warnings were not necessary as the
police officer's mere presence did not transform the school official's inter-
view of the child into a custodial interrogation.35 The court did not view the
setting as traditional custody as understood under Miranda.36 While the
child could not leave the principal's room, the court held that it was not de-
terminative of whether it was a custodial interrogation that had to be pre-
ceded by Miranda warnings.37 The court came to this conclusion based upon
the principle that children's liberty interests are lessened in the school set-
ting.38 As the appellate court put it, "[e]stablishing a blanket rule that ex-
cludes the presence of a police officer whenever a school administrator ques-
tions a student unless Miranda warnings are given turns a blind eye to the
threatening world surrounding our schools."39
A second school suspension delinquency case is MH. v. State.4° In this
case the child moved to suppress statements made to a school official in the
presence of a law enforcement officer who was employed as a school re-
27. See Michael J. Dale, 2003 Survey of Juvenile Law, 28 NOVA L. REV. 543, 567 (2004)
[hereinafter Dale 2003].
28. 851 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
29. Id. at 794, 797.
30. Id. at 794.
31. Id. at 797.
32. Id. at 795-96.
33. JT.D., 851 So. 2d at 795.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 797.
36. Id. at 796.
37. Id.
38. J.T.D.,851 So. 2d at 797.
39. Id.
40. 851 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
[Vol. 29:2:397
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source officer.4 Charges arose out of an altercation with another student in
the middle school.42 The school official questioned the child in the presence
of the resource officer 3.4  The court noted that "[a]ll questioning was done by
the school official except that the resource officer asked one question at the
end."44 Without any analysis, the court held that "[t]he mere presence of a
law enforcement officer, when a student is being questioned by a school offi-
cial, does not amount to a custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warn-
ings. 45
As in the school setting, the issue of proper Miranda warning cases are
reported in the appellate court case literature in Florida. Frances v. State
46
involved a challenge to the voluntariness of a juvenile confession. 47  The
child, who was sixteen at the time of the confession, claimed on appeal that
the confession was involuntary because he was not afforded an opportunity
to speak with his mother prior to the questioning.48 Florida courts have held
that there is no constitutional requirement that police notify a juvenile's par-
ents prior to questioning.49 Although section 985.207(2) of the Florida Stat-
utes5" requires police officers to attempt to notify a juvenile's parents when
taking the child into custody, failure to do so does not per se make a confes-
sion involuntary." Other states do provide by statute for such protection in
the form of required notification of parents. In Frances, the court did note
that had the child said he did not wish to talk to police until he had an oppor-
tunity to speak with his parents, the questioning would have ceased.53 Ap-
plying a totality of the circumstances test,54 the court held there was no basis
to conclude that the confession was in any way coerced or involuntary.5 '
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. MH., 851 So. 2d at 233-34.
46. 857 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
47. Id. at 1003.
48. Id.
49. Id. See Brancaccio v. State, 773 So. 2d 582, 583-84 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
50. FLA. STAT. § 985.207(2) (2004).
51. Frances, 857 So. 2d at 1004 (citing Ramirez v. State, 739 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 1999)).
52. See Michael J. Dale, Representing the Child Client, 5.03[7] (Matthew Bender & Co.
2004) (summarizing the case law around the country showing different approaches).
53. Frances, 857 So. 2d at 1004. See B.P. v. State, 815 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 2002).
54. See Ramirez, 739 So. 2d at 568 (describing the totality of the circumstances test).
55. Frances, 857 So. 2d at 1004.
2005]
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In Florida delinquency cases, pretrial practice and discovery issues do
not appear often in appellate case law. However, in F.R. v. State,56 a child
appealed from an adjudication of delinquency on a charge of trespass on the
grounds that the trial court, as a sanction for untimely disclosure of that wit-
ness, excluded a defense witness and denied a motion for continuance.
57
Two days prior to the trial the defense filed a witness list, which the state
claimed was untimely. The state asked the court to exclude the witness on
prejudice grounds, because it could not depose the witness.5 The defense
position was that counsel only became aware of the witness ten days before
the trial and did not disclose the witness until after he had the ability to inter-
view the individual.60 The question on appeal was whether the trial court
abused its discretion in excluding the witness as a sanction for the untimely
disclosure.6' The appellate court found that the testimony of the excluded
witness was highly relevant, juvenile proceedings operated under an expe-
dited time frame, and the sanction of exclusion is severe and a last resort
only to be used in extreme or compelling circumstances. 6' The court con-
cluded that this was an uncomplicated case, the defense gave a reasonable
explanation, and other less severe methods existed to overcome the preju-
dice. 63 The appellate court found an abuse of discretion and remanded for a
new trial.64
The Florida rules governing speedy trial in juvenile delinquency cases
provide that a child shall have an adjudicatory hearing within ninety days,
without demand, following the earlier of either the date the child was taken
into custody or the date the petition was filed.65 The Florida appellate courts
regularly review cases concerning affirmation of this rule.66 In Alvarez v.
State,67 a juvenile petitioned for issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the
trial court to dismiss an information charging him as an adult.68 The child
56. 860 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 502.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. F.R., 860 So. 2d at 502.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 503.
64. Id.
65. See FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.90(a).
66. See Michael J. Dale, 2002 Survey of Florida Juvenile Law, 28 NOVA. L. REV. 1, 5
(2003) [hereinafter Dale 2002]; Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law Issues in Florida in 1998, 23
NOVA L. REV. 819, 834-35 (1999) [hereinafter Dale 1998].
67. 849 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
68. Id. at 1090.
[Vol. 29:2:397
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was initially charged in a delinquency petition with one count of battery.69
The state entered a nolle prosequi because it was considering direct filing
against the child in the adult criminal division.7 ° The defendant argued that
the ninety-day juvenile speedy trial rule was triggered by the delinquency
petition, applied to the adult charges, and had run.7 The appeals court de-
nied the petition finding that the juvenile rules did not apply to the adult
charges filed, because by virtue of the nolle prosequi, nothing was pending
against the child in the juvenile court at the time the information was filed in
the adult court.72 The court relied on the Supreme Court of Florida opinion
in State v. Olivo,73 which held that while juvenile speedy trial rights are trig-
gered upon filing of delinquency petitions, the rules apply only while some-
thing is pending in the juvenile court.74 As nothing was pending in the case
at bar, the juvenile speedy trial rule did not apply.75
Under Florida law, parents or guardians of a child who is detained dur-
ing delinquency proceedings may be required to pay fees to the state for the
cost of the child's subsistence.76 In B.S. v. State,77 the child was taken into
police custody, subsequently ordered to home detention, and released to her
parents.7" While the matter was pending, the court ordered the parents to pay
twenty dollars a day for the cost of the child's care.79 The State subsequently
filed a nolle prosequi petition in the case, and the child then filed a pro se
motion to rescind the cost order."0 The child argued that the parents should
not be required to pay, because the State decided not to prosecute, and the
defendant was at home.8' Based upon the mandatory language of the stat-
ute ' 2 the juvenile court denied the motion.83 The child then brought a consti-
tutional challenge on both equal protection and substantive due process
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Alvarez, 849 So. 2d at 1091.
73. 759 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 2000).
74. Id. at 649.
75. Alvarez, 849 So. 2d at 1091.
76. FLA. STAT. § 985.215(b) (2004).
77. 862 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
78. Id. at 17.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. FLA. STAT. § 985.215(6) (2004). This statute provides "[w]hen any child is placed
into secure or home detention care ... the court shall order the parents ... to pay to the De-
partment of Juvenile Justice fees as provided under s. 985.2311." Id.
83. B. S., 862 So. 2d at 17.
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grounds.84  The child argued that the statute violated equal protection by
treating exonerated juveniles differently than exonerated adults.85 In addi-
tion, the child argued that the statute violated substantive due process by
requiring "payment of subsistence costs for a child's detention at home."86
The appellate court accepted both of the child's arguments.87 Applying an
ordinary scrutiny equal protection standard under Florida law,88 the court
could find no legitimate state objective to justify discriminating between
adults and juveniles in this context.89 The court also applied ordinary scru-
tiny to the due process question, concluding that requiring payment for home
detention bore no rational relationship to the permissible legislative objective
of alleviating the state's financial burden. 90 The court further held that re-
quiring a parent to pay both to support her child at home and to reimburse the
state for unexpended costs was arbitrary and oppressive.9
B. Dispositional Issues
Florida statutes provide the juvenile court with a variety of dispositional
powers, including probation, restitution, community service, curfew, revoca-
tion or suspension of driver's license, placement in a consequence unit,
placement in home detention, commitment to a licensed child care agency,
and commitment to the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) at a residential
commitment level (a level of security provided by programs that supervise
and care for the child).92 The issue in B.A.B. v. State93 was whether a juve-
nile disposition order "should be reversed because the trial court failed to
order and consider a predisposition report, ('PDR'), before making its final
disposition." 94 Under Florida law, "a predisposition report shall be ordered
for any child for whom a residential commitment disposition is anticipated or
recommended by an officer of the court or by the [D]epartment [of Juvenile
Justice]." 95 In denying the child's motion to correct the order, the trial court
84. Id. at 16.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 16-17.
87. Id. at 20.
88. B.S., 862 So. 2d at 18 (citing D.P. v. State, 705 So. 2d 593, 597 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1997)).
89. Id. at 19.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 19-20.
92. See §§ FLA. STAT. 985.231, .03 (2004).
93. 853 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
94. Id. at 554-55.
95. § 985.229(1).
[Vol. 29:2:397
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stated it did not order a PDR because the court had previously seen the child
on multiple occasions for prior offenses and commitment.9 6 The trial court
held that redundant investigations were unnecessary where the court already
had knowledge of the relevant information. 97 The appellate court held that
the statute's requirements are mandatory. 98 A predisposition report is re-
quired, the court shall consider it, and it shall be made available to the child
and counsel among others.99 It then concluded that there was no authority to
support the proposition that the court could, if it had knowledge of the
child's prior record, forego the statutory requirements.'00 It added that the
trial court effectively "created an exception to the applicable statutes and
rules that does not exist."'' More importantly and significantly, the trial
court deprived the child of an opportunity to review a PDR prior to his dis-
positional hearing as required by state law by relying upon its knowledge of
the child.12 Therefore, the court reversed and remanded.' 3
Issues concerning proper application of the restitution provisions of the
dispositional law in delinquency cases come regularly before the appellate
courts.' 04 J.D. v. State0 5 involved a restitution jurisdictional issue where the
trial court terminated probation without reserving jurisdiction for purposes of
restitution. 10 6 In failing to reserve jurisdiction, the trial court relied upon a
DJJ recommendation that probation be terminated, but DJJ overlooked the
fact that restitution had not been completed.0 7 When it became known that
restitution had not been completed, the court accepted the State's reliance on
the ground of a "scrivener's error," and vacated its order to reinstitute juris-
diction. 08 The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the decision. 0 9 It
found that the mistake was not a "scrivener's error," but concluded that the
court had authority to vacate its order on grounds of mistake under the Flor-
ida Rules of Juvenile Procedure."' However, despite the ability to vacate an
96. B.A.B., 853 So. 2d at 555.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 556.
101. B.A.B., 853 So. 2d at 556.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Dale 2003, supra note 27, at 569; Dale 2002, supra note 66, at 8; Dale 1998, supra
note 66, at 839.
105. 849 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
106. Id. at 459.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 461.
110. J.D., 849 So. 2d at 459 (citing FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.140).
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order on the grounds of mistake, the court had to "have jurisdiction over a
juvenile to enter an order." '' In the case at bar, the court lacked jurisdiction
because it failed to enter a restitution order before the child's nineteenth
birthday, the time jurisdiction would otherwise end.11 2 Instead, the new order
"merely reserved jurisdiction for restitution purposes."' 3 There being no
proper restitution order in effect prior to the respondent's nineteenth birth-
day, the court lacked jurisdiction to subsequently enter the order setting the
restitution amount. 1
14
C. Appellate Issues
The First District Court of Appeal dealt with a very important issue re-
garding application of what is commonly known as an Anders appeal in
A.F.E. v. State."5  In Anders v. California,"6 the United States Supreme
Court held that a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel
in criminal cases is not satisfied when an appointed appellate lawyer merely
reports by letter that there is no meritorious issue presented on appeal." 7
Pursuant to its ruling implementing Anders, the Supreme Court of Florida
held that the appellate court must then undertake "a full and independent
review of the record to discover any arguable issues apparent on the face of
the record."".8 The problem that arose in A.F.E. involved a legitimate catch-
22 situation.' 1' The defendant and several other juveniles were charged after
a note containing a bomb threat was found in their high school, and the ap-
pellant didn't contest the charge. 2 ° At the dispositional stage, DJJ recom-
mended probation with the alternative of commitment at a moderate risk
facility.' 2' The trial court rejected these alternatives and committed the child
to a high risk residential commitment facility.12 However, in its independent
review of the record, the appellate court found that the trial court's departure
did "not appear to be supported by competent substantial evidence in the
111. Id. at 460.
112. Id. See FLA. STAT. § 985.201(4)(a) (2004).
113. JD., 849 So. 2d at 460.
114. Id.
115. 853 So. 2d 1091 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
116. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
117. Id. at744.
118. In re Anders Briefs, 581 So. 2d 149, 151 (Fla. 1991).
119. See A.F.E., 853 So. 2d at 1091.
120. Id. at 1092.
121. Id.
122. Id.
[Vol. 29:2:397
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record" as required by state law,'23 but the child's counsel failed to preserve
the issue for appeal. 12 4 Because the child's lawyer neither objected at the
time the trial court entered its disposition nor filed a motion to correct the
disposition order pursuant rule 8.135(b)(2) of the Florida Rules of Juvenile
Procedure, the appellate court could not act. I2 5 All that remained was a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 26 However, as the appellate court
pointed out, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel "is of little practical
assistance in juvenile cases, where the sentence imposed may be completed
before any relief is granted."'127 Describing the problem as a dilemma, the
appellate court affirmed, but certified as a question of public importance
whether an appellate court can correct a sentencing error in an Anders case
that was not preserved pursuant to the applicable rules of procedure, and if
not, what steps should the appellate court follow to carry out the mandate of
Anders?
128
III. DEPENDENCY
Dependency court jurisdictional issues do not come up regularly in
Florida. An exception is J.M v. Department of Children and Family Ser-
vices.2 9 The case involved adjudication of an infant as dependent where the
child was absent from the State of Florida and where DCF had claimed that
there was a risk of harm to the child being "with his mother, who herself was
a minor and had been adjudicated dependent, but was on runaway status."' 130
The facts are significant. The trial court issued an ex parte order to take the
mother and the child into custody.' At no time had the infant been declared
dependent prior to the filing of the petition.32 The court held an arraignment
hearing, and ultimately entered a consent on behalf of the parent by default
after the court determined that there had been a diligent search to find her. 33
An attorney ad litem was present for the mother and objected to the adjudica-
123. Id. at 1093.
124. A.F.E., 853 So. 2d at 1093.
125. Id. at 1093, 1095.
126. Id. at 1094.
127. Id. at 1093.
128. Id. at 1095. See also The Honorable Martha C. Warner, Anders in the Fifty States:
Some Appellants' Equal Protection Is More Equal than Others', 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 625
(1996).
129. 851 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
130. Id. at 304.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 305.
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tion. 134 The court took hearsay evidence presented by DCF regarding the
mother's circumstances and adjudicated the infant child dependent.1 35 There-
after, the court held a dispositional hearing and established a reunification
case plan, which the mother ultimately signed when her whereabouts became
known. 36 The appellate court reversed the trial court order, finding that the
court lacked jurisdiction over the infant because DCF never had custody of
the infant child, and the mother was never given notice or the opportunity to
be heard. 37 Furthermore, the court order adjudicating the infant dependent,
where both mother and child were outside the jurisdiction, constituted a dep-
rivation of the mother's due process rights.
3 1
A more troubling jurisdictional case involving dependency is In re
D.N. 39 The case concerned two children as to whom a Hawaii court entered
an order of protection giving the father both legal and physical custody with
supervised visitations for the mother. 4° While proceedings were pending in
Hawaii, the mother took the children out of the state and was subsequently
arrested in Florida.' As a result, DCF filed a petition for dependency of the
two children against the mother only, never filing against the father.'42 Rely-
ing upon the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), which was
in effect in Florida, 4 3 the father quickly filed a motion to have the children
returned to him in Hawaii based upon the Hawaii custody order.'" Despite
the existence of the Hawaii order and the relevant statutory mandate, the trial
court denied the motion to have the two children returned. 45 DCF filed a
case plan defining tasks to the father for reunification, but never sought to
have the children adjudicated dependent as to the father. 46 Despite no find-
ing of dependency as to the father, the court approved the case plan. "4' For a
year and a half the father continued to seek to have the Hawaii custody order
enforced. 48 The trial court held an evidentiary hearing concerning return of
the children to the father, and DCF never raised issues of compliance with
134. J.M, 851 So. 2d at 305.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. 858 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
140. Id. at 1088.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. FLA. STAT. §§ 61.501-.542 (2004).
144. D.N., 858 So. 2d at 1088.
145. Id. at 1089.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC).'49 At the end
of the hearing, the trial court ordered the children returned to the father, and
despite that order, DCF refused to transfer the children to Hawaii. 50 The
father sought to enforce the court order, and at this late stage, DCF argued
that the Hawaii ICPC administrator had not approved the placement.' 5' The
court ordered the children placed with their father, and then DCF appealed,
even seeking a stay. 152 In the absence of a stay, the children were reunited
with their father while the case was pending on appeal. 53 In a detailed opin-
ion, the appellate court laid out what would have been obvious to any lawyer
in the field-the application of the UCCJA and the Parental Kidnapping Pre-
vention Act (PKPA).'54 In what could only be described as a significant un-
derstatement, the court concluded as follows:
Finally, we note that the Department has come under increased public scru-
tiny during the past year concerning the way it has handled, or mishandled,
certain cases. Given that scrutiny, we fail to understand why the Depart-
ment chose to focus its efforts in this case on keeping the two children
from a father who clearly wants them and who has a valid court order
awarding him custody. Further, we fail to understand why the Department
chose not to bring the controlling provisions of the UCCJA and the PKPA
to either the trial court's or this court's attention. In making these choices,
the Department strayed from its legislatively mandated objectives, and its
attorneys strayed from their duty to bring controlling authority to the
court's attention.' 55
The initial court proceeding in a dependency case is often the hearing
on a shelter petition. 156 This hearing takes place when "a child has been or is
to be removed from the home and maintained in an out-of-home placement
for a period longer than 24 hours."' 57 The issue In re j.P.'158 was whether the
father was "denied the statutorily afforded opportunity to be heard and to
present evidence at the shelter hearing. ' 59 The Pasco County Sheriffs Of-
fice filed a petition for placement in shelter of three children based upon fac-
149. D.N., 858 So. 2d at 1089; FLA. STAT. § 409.401 (2004).
150. D.N., 858 So. 2d at 1089.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1094.
153. Id.
154. 20 U.S.C. § 1738(A) (2003).
155. D.N, 858 So. 2d at 1094.
156. See FLA. STAT. § 39.402 (2004).
157. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.305(a).
158. 875 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
159. Id. at 716.
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tual allegations of domestic violence, the father's prior drug conviction, and
his current drug use. 6' At the shelter hearing, where both parents were rep-
resented by counsel, the mother's lawyer sought an opportunity to present
evidence. 61  The trial court decided that the hearing sought was discretion-
ary, and since the court never did "three-hour shelter hearings," 162 it refused
to start conducting them.163 It ruled that probable cause could be found on
the four corners of the affidavit. 16' The Second District Court of Appeal re-
versed, holding that Florida law provides parents with due process rights in
judicial proceedings involving temporary removal from the home. 65 Spe-
cifically, section 39.402 of the Florida Statutes provides that parents shall be
given "an opportunity to be heard and to present evidence at shelter hear-
ings.' 66 Further, the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure provide that per-
sons shall be given an opportunity to be heard and present evidence on the
criteria for placement under the law. 167 The appellate court concluded that
the judge below incorrectly held that the written submissions alone consti-
tuted probable cause despite the fact that the clear statutory and rule author-
ity afforded the parents the right to be heard and to present evidence at the
shelter hearing.168
The interplay of child custody issues in dependency proceedings and
domestic relations proceedings comes up often in Florida appellate case
law. 169 In King v. Jordan,7 ° the trial court initially entered an order granting
custody of the parties' daughter to the father during the course of a depend-
ency proceeding under Chapter 39"171 In exercising its continuing jurisdic-
tion as provided by statute, 172 the court subsequently reopened the depend-
ency proceeding, restored all of the mother's rights and obligations, and
granted her liberal visitation, while continuing the father's primary residen-
tial responsibility for the child. 173 At the close of the proceeding, the court
ruled that custodial and visitation rights were granted without prejudice to
160. Id. at 716-17.
161. Id. at 717.
162. Id.
163. J.P., 875 So. 2d at 717.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 718-19.
166. Id.
167. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.305(b)(4).
168. J.P., 875 So. 2d at 718.
169. See Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 2000 Survey of Florida Law, 25 NOVA L. REv.
91, 100 (2000) [hereinafter Dale 2000].
170. 850 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
171. Id.; FLA. STAT. ch. 39 (2004).
172. § 39.013(2).
173. King, 850 So. 2d at 646.
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the right of either parent to seek further relief under Chapter 61,174 Florida's
domestic relations child custody statute." 5 Thereafter, the mother petitioned
for primary residential custody pursuant to the dependency court's prior or-
der preserving her right to seek relief under Chapter 61. The court rejected
her claim, 7 6 citing Gibbs v. Gibbs, "' a case from the Second District Court
of Appeal, holding "that a party seeking to modify a custody decree must
establish a substantial change in circumstances since the final judgment and
that such a change justifies imposing a change in custody."'78 The appellate
court reversed, holding that the domestic relations standard applied in Gibbs,
relating to a modification of a custody decree after an initial Chapter 61 de-
termination, does not apply here, where the custody determination was made
in a Chapter 39 dependency proceeding. 79 The appellate court held that
when a custody arrangement is ordered in a dependency case, all the court is
doing is making a decision to place the child with a responsible adult, pref-
erably a parent. 80 Such a decision does not consider all of the elements of
the dissolution statute "concerning a determination of the primary residential
parent based on the best interests of the child." 8 ' The court concluded that
the extraordinary circumstances test applied to modification under Chapter
61 is not applicable when the initial custody determination was made in a
dependency case as opposed to a dissolution proceeding. 8 Unlike a dissolu-
tion or paternity custody order arising under Chapter 61, a custody order
arising from a Chapter 39 dependency proceeding is not a determination of
the best interest of the child for purposes of determining primary residential
custody."3
A second case involving custodial placement in the dependency context
is S.L. v. Department of Children and Families.'84 During the course of a
dependency proceeding against both parents arising out of severe violence
between the mother and the father in the presence of the children, the court
initially placed the children with their maternal uncle. 5 Thereafter, the
court placed the children jointly with the mother and the maternal grandpar-
174. Id.
175. FLA. STAT. ch. 61 (2004).
176. King, 850 So. 2d at 645.
177. 686 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
178. King, 850 So. 2d at 646 (citing Gibbs, 686 So. 2d at 639).
179. Id. at 647.
180. Id.
181. Id. (citing § 61.13).
182. Id.
183. King, 850 So. 2d at 647.
184. 852 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
185. Id. at 373.
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ent with unsupervised visitations for the father.'86 The father appealed,
claiming he was entitled to custody of the children because a parent is pre-
ferred over more distant relatives. 87 He relied upon Hammond v. Howard,88
a case arising out of the Fifth District. The appellate court rejected the appli-
cation of Hammond to a dependency proceeding because Hammond was a
domestic relations custody case arising under Chapter 61, which is unrelated
to dependency. 89 In a dependency case, the issue is whether the child should
be reunited with the parent.' 90 Furthermore, the court must determine
whether the parents substantially complied with the terms of the case plan as
well as considering the well-being and safety of the child.' 9' Finally, the S.L.
court opined that the court below had substantial flexibility in the depend-
ency proceeding because of the statutory obligation to include protective
supervision by DCF at the home of either or both parents.'9 2 The appellate
court thus affirmed.' 93
The question of application of speedy trial rules in a dependency case
was before the Fourth District in D.D. v. Department of Children and Fami-
lies.94 The father appealed the denial of a motion to dismiss because the
state failed to hold a dependency trial within thirty days as provided by Flor-
ida law.195 The father argued that the Supreme Court of Florida case, which
held the thirty-day time frame applicable to involuntary commitment proce-
dures, should apply to dependency cases. 96 The appellate court rejected this
argument. 97 It found that the juvenile rule governing speedy trials applies
only in delinquency cases. 198 According to the Fourth District, while the
Florida dependency statute does speak of a thirty-day period, it is not manda-
tory.' 99 Rather, it concluded that the thirty-day rule is discretionary, given
the nature of the proceedings and the state's interest in protecting a child's
welfare, which is paramount to the parents' interests.2 °°
186. Id.
187. Id. at 373-74.
188. 828 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
189. S.L., 852 So. 2d at 374.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.52 1(1)(b)(3) (2004)).
193. Id.
194. 849 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
195. § 39.507(1)(a).
196. D.D., 849 So. 2d at 475, (citing § 39.507(1)(a)); State v. Goode, 830 So. 2d 817,
825-26 (Fla. 2002)).
197. D.D., 849 So. 2d at 476.
198. Id. at475.
199. Id. at 476; see § 39.507(1)(a).
200. D.D., 849 So. 2d at 476.
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A case involving "default" or, more appropriately, "consent" to adjudi-
cation in the dependency in context" is R.P. v. Department of Children and
Families.2 °2 The consent occurred when a father, through counsel, advised
the court that due to the fault of the lawyer's office, the father was not told
until 5:45 p.m. the previous day that it was necessary for him to be at the
hearing.203 The father lived two hundred miles away and did not have a ve-
hicle.2° The father's counsel then asked for a brief continuance.2 5 When
the father did not appear in the afternoon, the attorney requested another con-
tinuance until the father's arrival, which the court denied and entered a de-
fault.2°6 On appeal, the Fourth District reversed, stressing the importance of
the parent-child relationship and warning the lower courts not to disrupt this
relationship on procedural grounds unless harm will befall the child.20 7
IV. PROSPECTIVE ABUSE AND NEGLECT
On July 8, 2004, just beyond the usual annual survey period for this ar-
ticle, the Supreme Court of Florida decided Department of Children and
Families v. F.L.205 This important opinion clarifies the application of pro-
spective abuse and neglect in both dependency and termination of parental
rights (TPR) cases, which was first addressed by the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida in 1991 in Padgett v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Ser-
vices.20 9 Prospective abuse or neglect was the subject of a lengthy discussion
of the intermediate appellate cases in last year's survey article.210 In that
case, the court ruled that permanent termination of parental rights to one
child on the basis of abuse and neglect may be sufficient grounds for termi-
nation of the parental rights to another child.21' However, the court held that
constitutional liberty interests required that the state "show by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the reunification with the parent poses a substantial
risk of significant harm to the child., 212 In addition, the court held that the
201. See infra pp. 413-19 for a discussion of consent in the termination of parental rights
context.
202. 835 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
203. Id. at 1213.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. R.P., 835 So. 2d at 1213-14.
208. 880 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 2004).
209. 577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991).
210. Dale 2003, supra note 27, at 559-64.
211. Padgett, 577 So. 2d at 571.
212. Id.
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State must prove that termination is the least restrictive means of protecting
the child from harm by the parent.1 3
F.L. specifically dealt with the issue of which party has the burden of
proof to show substantial risk of harm, or lack thereof, to a current child
based upon harm perpetrated upon another child.1 4 Since Padgett, a sub-
stantial number of appellate cases have interpreted it, both in the dependency
and termination of parental rights contexts.1 5 The courts were in disagree-
ment as to the proper interpretation of section 39.806(1)(i) of the Florida
Statutes, dealing with the test for terminating parental rights when the paren-
tal rights to a sibling have been involuntarily terminated.1 6 A quartet of ap-
pellate cases in the intermediate appellate courts were at odds as to the ap-
propriate burden of proof."' In A.B. v. Department of Children and Fami-
lies,2 18 T.P. v. Dep't of Children and Families,21 9 and In re TS.220 the courts
held that the statute validly created a rebuttable presumption of termination
of parental rights, which the parent could rebut.2  On the other hand, in
C. W. v. Department of Children and Families,2 Judge Erwin wrote a con-
curring opinion taking the view that the statute could not be used to terminate
parental rights solely on the basis of the parents' conduct.2 3 Likewise in
F.L., at the appellate court level, the court held that the section "unconstitu-
tionally shifts the burden to the parent to prove reunification would not be
harmful to the child. 224 The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed this opin-
ion.22 5 Applying Padgett, the court held that the statute may not constitu-
tionally be viewed to permit a termination of parental rights without proof of
substantial risk to the child. 226 A rebuttable presumption would relieve DCF
213. Id.
214. F.L., 880 So. 2d at 606-07.
215. Dale 2003, supra note 27, at 546-48, 559-64; Dale 2002, supra note 66, at 13-14,
18-19.
216. Dale 2003, supra note 27, at 546-48, 559-64; Dale 2002, supra note 66, at 13-14,
18-19.
217. Dale 2003, supra note 27, at 546-48, 559-64; Dale 2002, supra note 66, at 13-14,
18-19.
218. 816 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002); see contra Dale 2003, supra note 27, at
560.
219. 860 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
220. 855 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
221. A.B., 816 So. 2d at 684; TP., 819 So. 2d at 271; T.S., 855 So. 2d at 680.
222. 814 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
223. Id. at 493-98 (Erwin, J., concurring).
224. F.L. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 849 So. 2d 1114, 1116 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2003).
225. Fla. Dep't of Children & Families v. F.L., 880 So. 2d 602, 609 (Fla. 2004).
226. Id.
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of its burden of proof and would, according to the high court, violate the
constitutional requirements articulated in Padgett.227 The court held explic-
itly that the state must prove both the prior involuntary termination of paren-
tal rights to a sibling and a substantial risk of significant harm to the child
who is before the court.228 In addition, DCF must prove that termination of
parental rights is the least restrictive alternative for protecting the child from
harm. 229 The court gave the trial courts guidance on how to apply the sec-
tion, explaining that the circumstances leading to the prior termination are
highly relevant to the issue before the court concerning risk to the other
child.230 The parents' conduct which led to the involuntary termination may
tend to indicate a greater risk of harm to the current child. 3' The courts
should take into account the amount of time that passes between the two
events, and evidence of a change of circumstances since the prior involuntary
termination will be significant to the determination of risk. 32 Finally, the
court explained that past conduct has some predictive value as to likely fu-
ture conduct, which can be changed by positive life changes. 33 The court
emphasized that the parent is not obligated to show evidence of changed
circumstances to avoid the termination of parental rights.234 The court held
that DCF must prove by clear and convincing evidence2 35 that the rights of
the prior child were terminated involuntarily, that the child now before the
court is at a substantial risk of significant harm, and that termination of pa-
rental rights is the least restrictive alternative for the protection of the
child.236 The court then concluded that, so interpreted, the statute would be
constitutional.237
In two concurring opinions, Justices Pariente and Cantero were at odds
over an additional question-whether a manifest best interest determination
is the equivalent of an obligation of the State to prove substantial risk of
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 610.
230. FL., 880 So. 2d at 610.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. See generally, Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (holding the standard of
proof in termination of parental rights cases must be at least clear and convincing evidence to
comport with due process rights).
236. F.L., 880 So. 2d at 611.
237. Id.
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harm to the child under one of the statutory grounds for termination.2 38 Jus-
tice Pariente said no,23 9 and Justice Cantero said yes.24°
A separate ground for termination of parental rights involving prospec-
tive abuse or neglect is the situation where the parent has committed murder
or voluntary manslaughter of another child or a felony assault that results in
serious bodily injury to another child.241 A number of courts have held that a
nexus must be shown between the acts described in the subsection and the
potential for future abuse.242 The issue of nexus arose in J.F. v. Department
of Children and Families43 where the mother's stepchild was physically
abused and died while in her care as a result of blunt trauma to the stom-
ach.24 She was ultimately convicted of manslaughter and child abuse.245 On
appeal, the Fourth District reversed the trial court's termination of parental
rights, inter alia, rejecting DCF's position that no nexus need be shown.246
In so doing, the court noted that "[f]ailure to give the statutory scheme a nar-
row construction requiring the State to prove a nexus between the past con-
duct and the continuing substantial risk of harm to the current child could
render the statute constitutionally infirm. 247 DCF argued that the mother's
failure to take responsibility for the first child's death constituted the nexus
of danger necessary to the second child.248 The court held this argument in-
sufficient to support a finding that the mother posed a threat to her other
children.249
A second nexus case, this one occurring at the dependency stage, is N.S.
v. Department of Children and Families.25° In N.S., DCF commenced a de-
pendency proceeding alleging that the neglect of an older child was grounds
to find abuse and neglect of the younger children. The dependency proceed-
ing was commenced despite the fact that there were no allegations in the
petition that the parents had in fact abused and neglected any of the younger
children or that the children might be abused in the future. 251 There was nei-
238. See id. at 611-13 (Pariente, J., concurring); id. at 613-615 (Cantero, J., concurring).
239. F.L., 880 So. 2d at 611.
240. Id. at 615.
241. FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(h) (2004).
242. See Dale 2003, supra note 27, at 562-63.
243. 866 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
244. Id. at 82.
245. Id. at 83.
246. Id. at 88-89.
247. id. at 88.
248. J.F., 866 So. 2d at 88.
249. Id.
250. 857 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
251. Id. at 1000-01.
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ther testimony that the younger children were abused nor any evidence pre-
sented to support a conclusion that the younger children were at risk.252 Cit-
ing earlier case law, the appellate court reversed,253 concluding that the trial
court made no findings to draw a connection between the treatment of the
older child and the probable treatment of the younger children in the fu-
ture.
2 5 4
V. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
A. Adjudicatory Issues
Appellate opinions continue to appear relating to "defaults", or as noted
earlier, "consents" to terminations of parental rights or dependency based
upon non-appearance of the parent as often occurs in the dependency set-
ting. 5 In R.H. v. Department of Children and Family Services,256 the father
failed to appear on the trial date, and the court entered a default against
him.25 7 The father was advised of the trial date at the advisory hearing and
also through a letter from counsel. 8 However, the trial date was changed.2 59
The court sent written notice to the father's counsel who then sent a second
letter to the father "mimick[ing]" the first, but with the new trial date.2 60 The
father argued that he did not appear on the continued date, which in fact was
earlier in time, because he thought the second letter was simply a duplicate
of the first.261' The father filed a timely motion to vacate the default, attach-
ing the letters from counsel as well as a letter demonstrating completion of
an outpatient substance abuse program.2 62 The father claimed excusable ne-
glect and a meritorious defense.263 The trial court held a hearing and denied
the motion based upon the best interests of the child, finding no excusable
neglect. 2' The appellate court held that the failure of the trial court to accept
252. Id. at 1001-02.
253. Id. See also M.S. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 765 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 2000); M.N. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 826 So. 2d 445 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
2002).
254. N.S., 857 So. 2d at 1001.
255. See FLA. STAT. § 39.506(3) (2004).
256. 860 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
257. Id. at 987.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. R.H., 860 So. 2d at 987.
262. Id.
263. Id. See also FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b)(1).
264. R.H., 860 So. 2d at 987-88.
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the father's uncontroverted confusion was an abuse of discretion. 26" The
appellate court also found that the second element of the grounds for release
from judgment is not the best interest of the child, but rather whether there is
a meritorious defense.266 Finally, the court reversed because the trial court
terminated the father's parental rights without taking any evidence in support
of the termination, even assuming there was a default.267 Referring to the
United States Supreme Court case, Santosky v. Kramer,268 as well as other
Florida intermediate appellate court cases,269 the court held that even in a
default situation, evidence must be taken to determine the need for termina-
tion of parental rights. 7°
The issue of default also arose in a group of Second District cases, in-
volving both termination of parental rights and dependency. In In re L.A. 2 7' a
dependency case, the parent was in the restroom when the case was called.2 72
When the parent entered the courtroom, the trial court stated the following:
"Well, that's too late. You can just appeal if you need to. The record re-
flects it's 20 minutes to 10:00. This thing was set for 9:00.,,273 The appellate
court held that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the parent
consented to the adjudication of dependency. 274 The court held there was no
showing that a short continuance would have had adverse consequences to
the child.275 Relying on an earlier opinion from the Fourth District,276 the
appellate court found that there was no single valid reason to refuse the con-
tinuance, but rather good ones to grant it.2 77
In In re B.B. ,278 at a dependency arraignment hearing, the parent was un-
represented by counsel and not present when the case was called, but had
used his cell phone to contact the DCF employee in the courtroom directly.279
265. Id. at 988.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 988-89.
268. 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (recognizing the need for due process protections and the sig-
nificance of the parental interest at stake).
269. See M.A. v. Fla. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 760 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 2000); M.E. v. Fla. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 728 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1999).
270. R.H., 860 So. 2d at 988-90.
271. 857 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
272. Id. at 311.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 312.
275. Id.
276. R.P. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 835 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
277. L.A., 857 So. 2d at 312-13.
278. 858 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
279. Id. at 1185.
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The court apparently learned this information, confirmed that the parent had
been served, and requested that DCF move for a default, which they did.28°
The court did not appoint a lawyer for another five months, whereupon the
lawyer filed a motion to set aside the default.28 When the lawyer attempted
to argue the default should be set aside, the court cut off counsel's argument
and summarily denied the motion even though the parent was anxious to
testify and explain why he had arrived five minutes late for the hearing.282
The appellate court recognized that the trial court has lengthy dockets and
needs to manage them. 283 However, as the appellate court said, "dependency
arraignment hearings where many parties are unrepresented and all parties
have already demonstrated that they have difficulty coping with life's normal
burdens are an especially questionable place to rigidly impose 'defaults' as a
method of case management. "284 Furthermore, the appellate court held that
the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure provide that when a consent is en-
tered to dependency, there must be a disposition hearing within fifteen
days. 85 The trial court did none of these things in B.B.286 In addition, under
the rules, a party has a right to seek to withdraw a consent for good cause
prior to the beginning of the disposition hearing.287
In re C.D.288 was a termination of parental rights case in which the fa-
ther was "three minutes late for the initial advisory hearing., 289 According to
appellate court, he waited outside the courtroom in the waiting area for forty-
five minutes until he was told where the proper courtroom was located. 90
Because he wasn't in the courtroom when the case was called, the father was
"defaulted. '29' In addition, he was unrepresented by counsel at the termina-
tion hearing.292 Within ten days of the entry of the default, the father sent a
letter to the trial court explaining why he was late. 293 The appellate court
concluded that although the trial court should have regarded the letter as a
motion for rehearing, it made no ruling and instead terminated the father's
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. B.B., 858 So. 2d at 1185-86.
284. Id. at 1186.
285. Id. See FLA. STAT. § 39.506(5) (2004); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.315(a).
286. B.B., 858 So. 2d at 1186.
287. Id. See FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.315(b).
288. 867 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
289. Id.
290. Id. at 405-06.
291. Id. at 406.
292. Id.
293. CD., 867 So. 2d at 406.
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parental rights.294 One month after the termination, counsel was appointed to
represent the father.295 After reversing and remanding, the appellate court, in
a dramatic understatement, said that the trial court "must review these issues
and make a lawful decision as soon as possible following issuance of our
mandate. '296
The same problem occurred in the Fourth District. In A.M v. Depart-
ment of Children and Families,297 a termination of parental rights case, the
trial court entered a default against parents who were late for a hearing.298
According to the appellate court, the parents were mistaken about the public
transportation schedule, arriving one hour after the hearing was to begin.299
A consent to the termination of parental rights was thus entered.3°° The trial
court subsequently held a hearing on the parents' motion to set aside default
and denied it.3°1 Citing its prior holdings interpreting section 39.801(3)(d) of
the Florida Statutes,3 °2 the Fourth District vacated the default as an abuse of
discretion, holding that the trial court should ordinarily refrain from deciding
termination of parental rights cases by default where there was a reasonable
effort to be present by the parents. °3
The trial court also has an obligation to carefully weigh a parent's mo-
tion for continuance in a termination of parental rights case. In re D.S.304
arose out of a dispute between a mother and DCF about an alleged agreement
that DCF would not seek to terminate the parental rights as to her oldest
child so long as she relinquished parental rights as to her three other chil-
dren.305 The oldest child was in the custody of the father in Puerto Rico.30 6
The existence of the agreement came into dispute when a lawyer merely as-
sociated with the parent's counsel appeared on the day of trial to deliver con-
sents regarding the other children.3 7 The associated lawyer was under the
impression that there had been an agreement as to the consents, although
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. 853 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
298. Id. at 1084-85.
299. Id. at 1084.
300. Id. at 1085.
301. Id.
302. FLA. STAT. § 39.801(3)(d) (2004).
303. A.M, 853 So. 2d at 1085 (citing AJ. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 845 So. 2d 973
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003) and R.P. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 835 So. 2d 1212 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003)).
304. 849 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
305. Id. at 412.
306. Id.
307. Id.
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DCF strenuously denied that there was one.3" 8 When the lawyer requested a
continuance of the trial on the ground that he had understood there was an
agreement and was not prepared to try the case, the trial court denied the
request and proceeded with the trial.309 Despite the fact that trial courts have
broad discretion in granting or denying continuances, the appellate court held
that the trial court abused its discretion, and that the denial of a continuance
created an injustice to the mother based upon the fundamental liberty inter-
ests recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Santosky.3 1°
Discovery issues occasionally are the subject of reported opinions in
termination of parental rights cases. In A.A. v. Department of Children and
Families,31 the court held that the parent's lawyer did not have a right to the
release of the names and addresses of the two younger children's foster par-
ents.3"' In a pretrial motion, the father's counsel argued that DCF's wit-
nesses would testify that the children were in good homes with good foster
parents and the only way to challenge that testimony was by means of dis-
covery as to the foster parents. 3 3 The appellate court affirmed the trial court
ruling that DCF did not have to reveal the names and addresses of the foster
parents for several reasons.314 First, it found that the termination statute did
not allow the court, in considering the manifest best interests of the child, to
compare the attributes of the parents to those providing present or future
placement for the child.3"5 Thus, an evaluation of a foster parent's quality
was not material to the termination proceedings.3"6 Furthermore, as a matter
of public policy, the court held that there is a need to protect caretakers
against intimidation and harassment.317
Under Florida law, there are nine separate grounds for termination of
parental rights,318 one of which is incarceration of the parent.3 9 Two cases
dealt with this standard during the past survey period. In In re A.D. C.,320 a
parent appealed from an order terminating his parental rights to a child who
was one and a half years old at the time of the termination, inter alia, on the
308. Id. at412-13.
309. D.S., 849 So. 2d at 413.
310. Id.; 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
311. 852 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
312. Id. at 320.
313. Id. at 319.
314. Id. at 320.
315. Id. at 320-21 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.810 (2004)).
316. A.A., 852 So. 2d at 321.
317. Id.
318. § 39.806(1)(A)-(I).
319. § 39.806(1)(D).
320. 854 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
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ground that the parent's incarceration in a correctional institution would be
for a substantial portion of the time before the child obtained the age of
eighteen as required by statute.32' Under the facts of the case, the child
would be five years old at the time of the parent's release. 22 The appellate
court held, simply, that the time period in the case could not be described as
substantial, citing to other cases of limited incarceration time.323
In C.B. v. Department of Children and Families,324 the issue was
whether incarceration alone was enough to constitute grounds for termination
of parental rights when the specific ground for termination was abandon-
ment.325 The appellate court held that incarceration is a factor in considering
termination based upon abandonment, but incarceration alone is not suffi-
cient.326 In the case at bar, the court found that the mother kept in touch with
family members and constantly asked her sister, the child's aunt, about the
child.327 In turn, the aunt kept in communication with DCF.328 The child's
aunt also sent the mother pictures and kept the mother informed about the
child.329 The court reversed on the ground that the incarceration alone was
insufficient to justify termination.330 The court relied upon other cases re-
versing trial court decisions to terminate parental rights when an incarcerated
parent had not demonstrated a failure to make efforts to provide for the child
or carry out a case plan.33' Furthermore, the court made special mention that
DCF failed to provide the mother with the services necessary to complete a
case plan while incarcerated.332
In C.B., the court also dealt with egregious conduct as grounds for ter-
mination of parental rights.33 As defined by Florida statute, egregious con-
duct involves behavior that is "'outrageous by normal standards of con-
321. Id.at721.
322. Id.
323. Id. (citing W.W. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 811 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2002) (holding that fifty-four months is not a substantial period)); see also In re A.W.,
816 So. 2d 1261 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002)).
324. 874 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
325. Id. at 1248 (citing § 39.01 (defining abandonment)).
326. Id. at 1249 (citing In re T.B., 819 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002)).
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. C.B., 874 So. 2d at 1249-50.
330. Id. at 1250.
331. Id. at 1249 (citing TB., 819 So. 2d at 270; C.A.H. v. Dep't. of Children & Families,
830 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002); In re T.C.S., 647 So. 2d 1025 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1994)).
332. Id. at 1252.
333. Id. at 1253-55. See FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(f)(2004).
[Vol. 29:2:397
26
Nova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 10
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol29/iss2/10
2004 SUR VEY OF FLORIDA JUVENILE LA W
duct'. 334 In C.B., the trial court found that while the mother was incarcer-
ated her first child was adjudicated dependent.335 Thereafter, she was medi-
cally furloughed from prison and got pregnant with another child who was
the subject of the instant proceeding.336 The trial court found it was outra-
geous for the mother to get pregnant while furloughed with a child she could
not care for.337 The appeals court held that there must be a nexus between
the behavior and the abuse, neglect, or other specific harm to the child in
order to serve as grounds for termination based upon egregious conduct.33 8
In addition, the court pointed out that in the context of prospective abuse,
DCF must also prove a nexus between the prior act of abuse or neglect and
any prospective abuse or neglect, a topic discussed elsewhere in this sur-
vey.339
B. Appellate Issues
In one of its two major decisions involving children and families, the
Supreme Court of Florida, in S.B. v. Department of Children and Families,34 °
held that there is no right to pursue a collateral proceeding challenging the
competency of court-appointed counsel34 1-the commonly-understood inef-
fective assistance of counsel argument-in civil dependency proceedings not
involving the possibility of criminal charges against the parent or permanent
termination of parental rights.342 The court agreed to hear S.B. because of a
conflict in lower court opinions.343 The Supreme Court of Florida first found
that in dependency proceedings, which are civil in nature, parents must be
informed of the right to counsel at all stages and, if indigent, to have counsel
334. C.B., 874 So. 2d at 1254 (quoting § 39.806(0(2)).
335. Id. at 1248.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 1254.
338. Id.; see also P.S. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 863 So. 2d 392, 394 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that there must be a connection between the activity or conduct
involved and abuse or neglect or specific harm to the child).
339. Id. at 1254 (citing J.F. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 866 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 2004)).
340. 851 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 2003). For a detailed critical discussion of the case, see Michele
Forte, Note, Making the Case for Effective Assistance of Counsel in Termination of Parental
Rights Proceedings, 28 NOVA L. REv. 196 (2003).
341. S.B., 851 So. 2d at 690.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 691 (citing S.B. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 825 So. 2d 1057 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2002); L.W. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 812 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 2002)).
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appointed because state law so requires.344 The court then referred to In re
D.B.,3 a case in which the court previously held that a constitutional right to
counsel existed in dependency proceedings only in two cases: first, if the
proceedings would result in permanent termination of parental rights, and
second, when a parent might be charged with criminal child abuse.3 46 Be-
cause the parents in S.B. were not criminally charged, and there was nothing
to indicate that DCF was intending to bring a termination of parental rights
proceeding, there was no constitutional right to counsel in the case. 347 There
being no constitutional right to counsel, but only a statutory right, the court
held that there is no right to collaterally challenge the effectiveness of coun-
sel.34
8
VI. CHILD WELFARE CASES AND ADOPTION
The role of foster parents and grandparents in child welfare cases that
move to the adoption stage, as well as the extent of the trial court's authority
at the adoption stage, have been the subject of a number of reported cases in
Florida including two that are illustrative of problems in this area. In LB. v.
Department of Children and Families,349 foster parents appealed from an
order dismissing a petition to adopt a child, removing the child from their
home, and placing the child with a relative in Tennessee.35 The foster par-
ents, among other things, "moved to reappoint a guardian ad litem, intervene
in the dependency action, consolidate the dependency action with their adop-
tion case and place the case on the trial docket.""35 As to the guardian ad
litem program which had been very active in the case earlier on, the appellate
court stated, "[u]nfortunately, the Program responded they had no available
guardians and so were discharged from the appointment. 35 2 Ultimately, the
344. Id. at 691.
345. 385 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1980).
346. S.B., 851 So. 2d at 692 (citing D.B., 385 So. 2d at 87, 90).
347. Id. at 693.
348. Id. at 693-94.
349. 876 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
350. Id. at 582.
351. Id. at 583.
352. 1d. For a detailed discussion on the subject of adequate representation of children in
child welfare proceedings, including issues related to the voluntary nature of the program and
the state court's attitudes toward it, see Michael J. Dale, Providing Counsel for Children in
Dependency Proceedings in Florida, 25 NOVA L. REv. 769 (2000). See also Guardian Ad
Litem: The Voice For Florida's Abused and Neglected Children, 2004 Progress Report (stat-
ing that approximately half of the 42,565 children in the system had a guardian ad litem on
June 30, 2004).
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court held a hearing, but took no evidence.353 Instead, it ruled that as a mat-
ter of law the decision to select the appropriate adoptive parents was one for
DCF and not for the judiciary, and that the foster parents lacked standing to
challenge DCF's decision.354 The appellate court reversed and remanded.355
First, it found, as had other courts, that foster parents have standing to inter-
vene 356 and are proper participants under the Florida Rules of Juvenile Pro-
cedure, even if not proper intervenors. 57 The appellate court then concluded
that the trial court erred "by refusing to consider the child's best interests
before changing placement from the foster parents to the relatives., 358 Under
the relevant provisions of both the dependency and adoption statutes, 359 the
appeals court held that the authority and discretion of DCF regarding adop-
tive placement is not absolute. 360 The appellate court also held that the trial
court had "inherent and continuing jurisdiction to entertain matters pertaining
to child custody and to enter any order appropriate to a child's welfare. 361
The foster parents attempted to challenge the Chapter 39 proceedings as
facially violative of equal protection because, while Chapter 63 refers to a
best interest test governing adoption of a child, according to the foster par-
ents, DCF had unfettered discretion in adoption under Chapter 39.362 The
appellate court held that the best interest standard applies in both instances.363
In B.B. v. Department of Children and Families,3" a grandmother ap-
pealed from a final order denying her motion to intervene in a dependency
proceeding related to twin grandchildren as well as the denial of her petition
for adoption.3 65 The trial court refused to address the adoption petition on the
merits.366 During the course of the dependency proceedings, the two children
were transferred to the appellant as the children's relative custodian where
they resided for a period of time. 367 After the appellant's son, whom DCF
353. LB., 876 So. 2d at 583.
354. Id. at 584.
355. Id. at 588.
356. Id. at 584 (citing Sullivan v. Sapp, 866 So. 2d 28, 33 (Fla. 2004); FLA. R. Civ. P.
1.230).
357. I.B., 876 So. 2d at 584 (citing FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.210(b)).
358. Id. at 586.
359. FLA. STAT. §§ 39.812(4), (5), 63.022(2).
360. Id.
361. Id.; see also Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. J.C., 847 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 2002).
362. LB., 876 So. 2d at 586.
363. Id.
364. 854 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
365. Id. at 823.
366. Id.
367. Id. at 824.
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advised could no longer reside in the appellant's home if the children were to
remain, failed to move out within twenty-four hours, DCF removed the chil-
dren from her home. 368 However, DCF did leave five of appellant's minor
nieces and nephews in her home.3 69 At the termination of parental rights
trial, DCF was considering a cousin as a suitable adoptive home.37 ° The
cousin ultimately was unable or unwilling to adopt, and DCF took no steps to
assist the appellant to obtain custody, and in fact reduced her visitation
rights.371 The grandmother then filed a motion to intervene in the ongoing
dependency proceeding and to enforce an earlier court order that she be con-
sidered for adoption in the event the cousin could not adopt.37 The trial
court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction until an adoption petition was filed un-
der Chapter 63. The grandmother filed a petition, and the trial court de-
nied it.3 74 The trial court held that it: "lacked jurisdiction, because the de-
pendency court [under Chapter 39] has ongoing reviews and jurisdiction
until the children are adopted; that DCF had identified another adoptive
home for the twins; that DCF did not consent to Appellant's adoption of the
twins and, absent DCF's consent, an adoption petition must be denied., 375
The appellant was also denied intervener status.376
The appellate court held, first, that the trial court was in error in stating
that it lacked jurisdiction.377 It held that the dependency court has jurisdic-
tion after a TPR trial despite the fact that there may be a subsequent adoption
proceeding under Chapter 63.378 In fact, according to the appellate court, the
statutes prescribe jurisdiction. 379 As in .B., 38° DCF argued that the court
must give "unqualified deference to [their] placement decision., 38' The ap-
pellate court disagreed, finding that the agency's "authority and discretion
are not absolute. 382 The court gave examples such as the court's ability to
place conditions on the exercise of DCF discretion concerning the children
and the court's ability to refuse to grant the adoption petition of a non-
368. Id.
369. B.B., 854 So. 2d at 824.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 825.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. B.B., 854 So. 2d at 825.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. B.B., 854 So. 2d at 825 (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 39.812(4), -.813 (2003)).
380. 876 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
381. B.B., 854 So. 2d at 826.
382. Id.
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relative.383 Relying on an earlier opinion from the Fourth District Court of
Appeal in Florida Department of Children and Families v. Adoption of
B.G.J. ,384 the court held that non-interference by the court would exist so
long as the selection was appropriate and in compliance with policies made
in an expeditious manner.385 Thus, the appellate court concluded that the
trial court has an obligation to "ensure that DCF's selection is appropriate
and consonant with DCF's policy. 38 6 Given the statutory and case law pref-
erence for grandparents in the adoption process, the grandparent had priority,
and failure to consider the individual with such priority was neither appropri-
ate under the facts of the case nor consistent with DCF policies and Florida
law governing relative placement.387
VII. STATUTORY CHANGES
The Florida Legislature made a number of statutory changes in the past
year in the delinquency area, including a change regarding the obligation of
families to pay for the cost of supervision of children in delinquency care.3 88
The new law requires the court to order a parent of a child who is in home
detention, on probation, or other supervised status or placement, secure de-
tention or committed to DJJ to pay a daily fee for costs of supervision and
care.3 89 Under certain circumstances, the court can reduce the fees.39 °
On the dependency side, the legislature passed a statute governing edu-
cation of abused, neglected, and abandoned children.3 91 As is typical in Flor-
ida, the legislation fails to provide any rights or a cause of action.392 Fur-
thermore, the legislation does not require an expenditure of funds.393 How-
ever, it does obligate DCF to enter into an agreement with the Department of
Education concerning the education and related services of children known
to them. 394 It also requires DCF to enter into agreements with school boards
and other entities regarding children known to them,395 including enrollment
383. Id.
384. 819 So. 2d 984 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
385. B.B., 854 So. 2d at 826 (citing Adoption of B.G.J., 819 So. 2d at 986).
386. Id. at 827.
387. Id.
388. FLA. STAT. § 985.2311 (2004).
389. § 985.2311(1)(a)-(b).
390. § 985.2311(3)-(4).
391. § 39.0016.
392. See § 39.0016.
393. Id.
394. § 39.0016(3).
395. § 39.0016(4).
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in school, notification of the name and phone number of the child, establish-
ing a protocol to share information, and notification of DCF's case plan-
ning.396 In return, the school district will provide DCF with a listing of its
services, identify services which are needed for children known to DCF, de-
termine whether transportation is available, continue enrollment in the same
school throughout the time the child is known to DCF, provide individual-
ized student intervention when necessary, cooperate in assessment of ser-
vices and support needed for the children, and appoint a surrogate parent
under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.
397
The legislature also passed a statute setting up a procedure for release of
confidential information contained in the records of DCF pertaining to "in-
vestigations of alleged abuse, abandonment, or neglect of the child."'3 98 The
statute provides a test for release based upon good cause for public access
found to be in the best interest of the child who is the focus of the proceed-
ing. 3
99
The legislature passed a judicial review procedure for children aging out
of the dependency system.4" It provides for a mandatory judicial review
hearing within ninety days after a child's seventeenth birthday and hearings
thereafter to review the status of the child concerning a series of matters re-
lated to the child's movement toward independent living." 1 Included is the
power of the court, when it concludes that DCF has not complied with its
obligation as articulated in the written case plan for the child or the provision
for independent living services as otherwise provided by Florida law, to issue
an order to show cause, give DCF thirty days to comply, and ultimately to
hold DCF in contempt. 40 2 The same statute also requires DCF to continue to
include independent living and life skills information in its report to courts
on the status of thirteen to eighteen year olds.4 °3
The legislature also made a very specific change to the post disposition
provisions of Chapter 39 regarding petitions for adoption and the involve-
ment of licensed foster parents or court-ordered custodians. 4 4 It changed
Chapter 39 to provide that when a foster parent or custodian is not granted an
application to adopt, DCF cannot move the child from the foster home absent
396. § 39.0016(4)(a)(1)-(4).
397. § 39.0016(4)(b)(1)-(4), (c)(5); 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (2000).
398. FLA. STAT. § 39.2021(1) (2004).
399. Id.
400. § 39.701.
401. § 39.701(6).
402. § 39.701(6)(a)-(c).
403. § 39.701(7)(a)(10).
404. See § 39.812.
[Vol. 29:2:397
32
Nova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 10
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol29/iss2/10
2004 SURVEY OF FLORIDA JUVENILE LAW
a prior court order." 5 The exceptions to this section are if there is danger of
abuse and neglect, the foster parent agrees, or most significantly, thirty days
have expired following a written notice to the foster parent, and there has
been no formal challenge to the agency decision.4"6
Finally, the legislature allowed DCF to enter into agreements "with a
private provider to finance, design, and construct a [mental health] treatment
facility... of at least 200 beds and to operate all aspects" of that facility.40 7
The agreements cannot exceed twenty years.40 8
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Florida decided two significant cases in this past
reporting year. They deal with the question of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel in dependency cases4" and the burden of proof in a termination case
where the parental rights to another child in the family have already been
terminated.4" ° At the appellate level, the intermediate appellate courts have
been very active in both the dependency and the termination of parental
rights areas, ruling on a number of issues including how the courts should
handle proceedings where the parents miss their appearance4 ' and in delin-
quency cases involving school settings.4"2
405. § 39.812(4).
406. § 39.812(4)(a)-(c).
407. § 287.057(14)(b).
408. Id.
409. See S.B. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 851 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 2003).
410. See Fla. Dep't of Children & Families v. F.L., 880 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 2004).
411. See R.H. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 860 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 2003); In re I.A., 857 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003); In re B.B., 858 So. 2d
1184 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003); In re C.D., 867 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003);
A.M. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 853 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
412. See State v. J.T.D., 851 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003); M.H. v. State, 851
So. 2d 233 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
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